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1. Introduction 
The stock market crash of October 19, 1987, has generated an enormous 
amount  of  analysis  and  debate.  In less  than  six months,  commissions 
representing  the President,  Congress,  the Securities and Exchange Com- 
mission,  the  Commodity  Futures Trading Commission,  the  New  York 
Stock  Exchange,  and  the  Chicago  Mercantile Exchange  have  provided 
thorough reports. There also have been many academic papers written on 
the subject, and there are many more to come.  Although  the details and 
emphases  differ, the question underlying most of these papers and reports 
is "What caused the crash and how  can we prevent another one?" Was it 
caused by a breakdown of trading mechanisms  or by portfolio insurance? 
Should  the  government  require higher  margins  on  futures  contracts or 
should  the public shun firms that profit from index arbitrage? 
There is a basic issue  that must be addressed before these  and similar 
questions  can  be  resolved.  Was  the  crash  a  rational response  to  new 
information, or is it evidence  that stock prices are set irrationally? 
Under the efficient market hypothesis,  prices reflect all available infor- 
mation. This hypothesis  has been debated vociferously by academics for 20 
years.  Practitioners usually  dismiss  the debate as an irrelevant academic 
diversion.  In fact, the  competing  views  about market efficiency lead  to 
different conclusions concerning the 1987 crash and its policy implications. 
There are three broad interpretations of the dramatic price drop. 
1.  Stock prices were  close  to  fundamental  values  before  the  crash.  On 
October 19, 1987, investor panic or a breakdown of market mechanisms 
drove prices to irrationally low levels. 
2.  Stock prices were  close  to  fundamental  values  both  before and  after 
October 19. The crash was a rational response  to new  information. 278 *  FRENCH 
3.  Stock  prices  were  above  fundamental  values  before  the  crash.  The 
decline brought them closer to efficient levels. 
Many of the recommendations  in the commission reports and academic 
papers only make sense under the first interpretation, that the market crash 
drove  prices  to  irrationally low  levels.  However,  this  is  the  least likely 
explanation. Under the other two interpretations, the crash maintained or 
improved  market efficiency.  Thus,  from the  perspective  of  market effi- 
ciency, policies to inhibit future crashes are misguided. 
No  one  would  argue  that markets are perfectly efficient-that  prices 
always  equal  fundamental  values.  The  debate  is  about  the  size  of  the 
deviations  from fundamental value.  While defenders  of market efficiency 
argue that these  deviations  are small and  essentially  irrelevant, skeptics 
contend  that  they  are economically  important.  The  October  1987 crash 
provides  an unusual  opportunity to examine the merits of the competing 
positions. 
2. Market  Efficiency,  Dividend  Yields,  and  the 
Predictability  of Returns 
If the market is efficient and expected  returns are constant,  stock returns 
are not predictable. Evidence of predictability has been  accumulating for 
over 20 years. See, for example, Fama (1965), Fama and Schwert (1977), and 
Keim  and  Stambaugh  (1986).  The  common  conclusion,  usually  from 
monthly  data, is that the predictable component  of returns accounts for a 
small part (usually less  than 3 percent) of stock return variances. Recent 
work by Fama and French (1987a, 1988), Poterba and Summers (1987), and 
Campbell and Shiller (1988) suggests  that the predictable component  is a 
larger fraction of  long  horizon  returns.  For example,  Fama and  French 
(1987b, 1988) show that ex ante dividend yields often explain more than 25 
percent  of  2-year  to  4-year  stock return variances.  Some  interpret this 
strong predictability as evidence  that the market is inefficient. However, 
the  data only  allow  rejection of  the joint hypothesis  that the  market is 
efficient and expected returns are constant. 
In fact, the behavior of expected returns identified by Fama and French 
(1987b, 1988) is consistent  with a large class of equilibrium models.  They 
never forecast reliably negative  nominal,  real, or excess  stock returns for 
the value- or equal-weighted  New  York Stock Exchange (NYSE) portfolios. 
Forecasts of excess stock and bond returns move together. The variation in 
expected  excess returns is larger for stock portfolios than for bond portfo- 
lios, and larger for low-grade bonds than for high-grade bonds. Finally, the 
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when  conditions  are good  and high when  conditions  are poor. Thus the 
forecasted returns fit preconceptions about risk premiums. 
The  evidence  is  also  consistent,  however,  with  simple  models  of  an 
inefficient market in which prices take long swings away from fundamental 
values.  In  this  framework,  dividends  measure  fundamental  value,  so 
dividend  yields change as prices wander away from rational levels.  If the 
market will eventually correct its mistakes, current dividend yields provide 
information about future returns. When  prices are irrationally low,  divi- 
dend  yields  and  expected  returns are high.  When  prices are irrationally 
high,  dividend  yields and expected returns are low. 
3. Was  the  Crash  an Irrational  Move  Away  from  Rational 
Prices? 
Most of the analysis and recommendations about the October price decline 
presume  that the crash was  undesirable. From the perspective of market 
efficiency,  this view  is appropriate if investor  panic or a breakdown  of 
market mechanisms  drove prices from a level that was rational before the 
crash  to  a  level  that  was  irrationally low  after the  crash.  This  seems 
unlikely. 
Dividend  yields  were  at historically low  levels  before  the  crash.  For 
example,  the annual yield  on the Standard and Poor's Composite  Index 
(S&P 500) was 2.70 percent in September 1987. This was almost 2 percent 
lower  than  the  average  yield  for  1926-86,  4.52  percent.  September's 
dividend yield was lower than all but one of the 244 quarterly observations 
of the annual yield during the 1926-86 period. (The lowest was 2.67 percent 
in December  1972.) The October price shock raised the dividend  yield to 
3.71 percent at the end of December 1987. 
Perhaps  the  extremely  low  dividend  yields  before  the  crash and  the 
moderate yields after the crash reflect a rational change in expected returns. 
Alternatively, perhaps the increased dividend yields reflect a drop in prices 
from irrationally high  levels  toward more rational lower levels.  It seems 
unlikely,  however,  that a  movement  away  from historically low  yields 
toward average values was caused by an irrational price drop. 
4. The  Efficient  Market  Interpretation 
The  stock  market  crash  poses  a  challenge  for  champions  of  market 
efficiency.  What new  information reduced  fundamental  values  by  more 
than 20 percent on October 19, 1987?  If the market was efficient before and 
after the crash, the price decline must have been caused by new informa- 
tion about future cash flows  or about the rate at which  those  cash flows 
should be discounted. 280- FRENCH 
Some potentially important news was released over the weekend  before 
the  crash.  For example,  the  press  reported speculation  that the  Federal 
Reserve would  raise its discount rate, and the government  announced  its 
intention to allow the dollar to decline against the West German mark. On 
the morning of October 19, 1987, the United States bombed an Iranian oil 
platform  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  Although  these  stories  may  have  been 
important,  few  would  argue  that  they  changed  expectations  of  future 
cashflows  enough  to explain the market crash. 
The alternative is to consider news  about expected  returns. Fama and 
French (1988) show  that shocks  to expected  returns are associated  with 
opposite  shocks to current prices. They call this relation the discount rate 
effect. Based on  their point  estimates  for nominal  returns on  the value- 
weighted  NYSE  portfolio  for  1941-86  (their longest  period  of  roughly 
homoskedastic returns), a 1 percent increase in next year's expected return 
produces  a 4 percent drop in the current price. 
The dividend  yield on the S&P 500 index was 2.70 percent at the end of 
September  1987 and  3.71  percent  at the  end  of  December.  With  these 
values,  the 1941-86 nominal return regression in Fama and French (1988) 
implies  an  expected  annual  return  of  about  3  percent  for  the  value- 
weighted  NYSE  portfolio  before  the  crash  and  about  8  percent  after. 
Because  of  the  discount  rate effect,  this  5 percent  increase in  expected 
returns should lead to a price decline of about 20 percent-only  slightly less 
than the 22 percent drop in the S&P 500 on October 19, 1987. 
This expected return argument still leaves defenders of market efficiency 
in  a  quandry.  Where  is  the  news  that raised expected  returns from 3 
percent to 8 percent? Perhaps prices fell because expected returns rose, but 
it seems  more likely that expected returns rose because prices fell. 
5. The  Bubble  Hypothesis 
The  most  common  interpretation of the  market crash is that it was  the 
inevitable collapse of a speculative bubble. As a bubble forms, prices rise 
above  fundamental  values.  Investors  realize that  prices  are irrationally 
high, but each buys in the belief that he will be able to sell before the price 
falls.  In essence,  each buyer believes  a greater fool  will buy  from him. 
When the bubble bursts, prices plummet back toward fundamental values. 
The  behavior  of  stock  prices  around  the  crash  supports  this  bubble 
scenario. There was a dramatic increase in prices (the Standard and Poor's 
Composite  Index rose by 33 percent during the first nine months of 1987), 
followed by a cataclysmic decline (the S&P 500 fell by 9 percent during the 
week before the crash and by 22 percent on October 19, 1987). The behavior 
of dividend  yields  is also consistent  with  the bubble hypothesis.  Yields Crash-Testing  the  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis  *  281 
were at historically low levels in September and returned toward average 
values after the crash. 
One of the critical components  of the bubble hypothesis,  however,  is a 
consensus  among investors that prices are irrationally high,  coupled with 
each investor's belief that he will be able to sell before prices fall. There is 
little evidence  of such a consensus  before the crash. Many now claim that 
they knew  prices were too high before the crash, but this selective recall 
does not fit the facts. For example, the October 20, 1987, Wall Street  Journal 
described traders' reaction to the price drop as one of "stunned disbelief" 
(WSJ  pg. 1). The first Wall  Street  Journal  report of a newsletter that predicted 
the crash was not published until two days later, on Thursday, October 22. 
Thus,  although  the bubble theory is popular after the crash, it does  not 
seem to be consistent with market opinion before the crash. 
6. Rational  and  Irrational  Information  Aggregation 
By a process of elimination, I am inclined toward the conclusion that prices 
were above fundamental values before the crash, but that investors did not 
know  they were too high.  Standard models of rational information aggre- 
gation,  such as Diamond  and Verrechia (1981) and Admati (1985), imply 
that prices equal fundamental values on average.  If the amount of noise in 
the  system  is  sufficiently  large,  prices can be  arbitrarily far away  from 
fundamental  values.  Thus, it is easy for rational models  to explain prices 
that are too high.  The challenge  is to describe a rational (and plausible) 
model  in which  traders can infer that they have made an enormous  error 
from a small amount of bad news. 
The  alternative  is  to  consider  the  possibility  of  irrational behavior. 
Financial economists  are justifiably reluctant to introduce irrationality into 
models  of  market equilibrium.  Rational models  have  explained  a wide 
range  of  economic  phenomena.  More  important,  there  is  no  standard 
framework to  constrain the  sort of irrationality one  might  introduce.  In 
general,  financial economists  have resisted the temptation to use  ad hoc 
assumptions  of irrationality  to "explain" individual anomalies or events. At 
the risk of appearing weak-willed,  I will yield to that temptation. 
In standard models of information aggregation, economic agents ration- 
ally combine their own private information with the information they infer 
from observed  prices and volume.  Perhaps real investors  put too  much 
weight  on market signals and not enough  on their own  information. For 
example, French and Roll (1985) find that stock return variances are much 
lower when markets are closed than when they are open. They suggest this 
may imply that investors over-react to each other's trades. 
From this perspective,  the typical investor's private information before 282  FRENCH 
the  crash was  more  pessimistic  than the  information implied  by  prices. 
However,  because the typical investor put too much weight on the market 
information, he mistakenly believed he was atypical and that other inves- 
tors were more optimistic. This misperception could have led to irrationally 
high prices before October 19, 1987. 
Several pieces of bad news were released on October 14-16. For example, 
on  Wednesday,  October  14, the  government  announced  that the  trade 
deficit for August  was $15.7 billion. The Brady Commission  (1988) reports 
that this "was about $1.5 billion above the figure expected by the financial 
markets." There was also news  that the House Ways and Means Commit- 
tee  would  support  legislation  to eliminate  the  tax benefits  of  leveraged 
buyouts  and to impose  a new  tax on greenmail profits. On Thursday, the 
Administration  announced  its  reluctance  to  support  the  dollar against 
foreign currencies. On Friday, there was an Iranian attack on a U.S.-flagged 
oil tanker in the Persian Gulf. 
In my scenario, these events  corroborated the private information held 
by investors. With this confirmation, each investor increased the weight he 
placed on his own  information and reduced the weight  he placed on the 
market. This, in turn, caused him to make large revisions in his assessment 
of fundamental values and in the price he was willing to pay for stocks. To 
each  investor's  surprise,  others  were  making  similar  large  revisions. 
General confirmation of individuals' pessimistic private information led to 
large price declines. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 95 points on 
Wednesday,  57 points on Thursday, and 108 points on Friday. At the time, 
the  Wednesday  and  Friday drops  were  the  largest absolute  changes  in 
history. These large price responses,  in turn, led investors to conclude that 
others also had pessimistic  private information. Thus,  the big news  that 
drove  prices  down  on  October  19 may  have  been  the  market's  large 
response  to moderately bad news  over the previous three trading days. 
This  story was  developed  to  interpret the  events  of  October 1987. It 
would be interesting to see whether a more explicit model along these lines 
could explain any other phenomena. 
7. Should  We  Outlaw  the  Next Crash? 
One  of the  most  important proposals  in the Brady Commission's  (1988) 
report on the stock market crash is a recommendation that circuit breakers, 
such as price limits and trading halts, should be implemented  in all equity 
markets. These circuit breakers would halt trading for a variety of reasons, 
including  excessive  price  changes,  excessive  volume,  and  large  order 
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anisms to slow sharp price declines depend  on one's interpretation of the 
1987 crash. 
Stock market prices provide important signals about the productivity of 
capital.  If the  market is  inefficient,  resource  allocations based  on  these 
signals  are  distorted.  Thus,  one  way  to  evaluate  regulations  that  are 
intended  to impede  the  next crash is to ask whether  they  will improve 
market efficiency. 
From the  perspective  of  market efficiency,  circuit breakers and  other 
mechanisms  intended  to slow large price changes are desirable if investor 
panic or a breakdown of market mechanisms drove prices to an irrationally 
low level during the 1987 crash. However,  this explanation of the crash is 
the least likely of the interpretations I consider. 
Under all other interpretations, circuit breakers would  reduce efficiency 
and distort the market's price signals. For example, if the 1987 crash was 
simply  an  efficient  market's  response  to  news  about  expected  future 
cashflows  or expected returns, restrictions on price changes would  drive a 
wedge  between  observed prices and fundamental values.  Similarly, if the 
crash was the conclusion of a speculative bubble, circuit breakers slow the 
market's adjustment toward rational prices. 
The Brady Commission's (1988) circuit breaker recommendation may not 
have been motivated by concerns about market efficiency, but rather by the 
possibility that the crash itself lowered  fundamental values.  For example, 
perhaps  uncertainty  created by  the  cataclysmic price  decline  increased 
required returns. Alternatively,  perhaps the sudden  reduction in wealth 
disrupted  consumers'  spending  plans and lowered  the market's expecta- 
tion of future cash flows. 
This feedback, from the market to the economy,  is procyclical. A drop in 
fundamental  values lowers  stock prices which  drives fundamental values 
down  further. The possibility of preventing procyclical feedback is attract- 
ive.  However,  there is no reason to believe that circuit breakers or other 
mechanisms  designed  to delay large price changes  will reduce this feed- 
back. There is little theory or evidence about how this feedback mechanism 
works.  Perhaps circuit breakers would  have  reduced  the feedback from 
October  19,  1987,  by  spreading  the  price  decline  over  several  days. 
However,  it is also possible  that such  trading halts would  have  created 
more disruptions and increased the feedback. 
8. Conclusions 
Because fundamental  values  are unobservable,  researchers trying to test 
whether  the aggregate price level is rational are forced to use an indirect 
approach.  The  usual  method  is  to  test  whether  observed  returns  are 284 *  FRENCH 
consistent with some equilibrium model. For example, the classic model in 
these tests says that expected returns are constant and that prices follow a 
random  walk.  Since  the  tests  are indirect,  researchers can  never  reject 
market  efficiency;  they  can  reject only  the  joint  hypothesis  of  market 
efficiency and a particular equilibrium model. 
Large  news  events  and  large  stock  price  changes  provide  another 
indirect  way  to  examine  market efficiency.  If markets are efficient and 
prices equal fundamental  values,  information that changes  fundamental 
values also changes prices. Thus, financial economists have argued that the 
market's  ability  to  distinguish  between  real  and  cosmetic  changes  in 
reported earnings is evidence of efficiency. Similarly, if prices always equal 
fundamental values, each price change must reflect a change in fundamen- 
tal value. 
Economists are not good  at explaining observed price changes.  Rather 
than view  this failure as evidence  of inefficiency,  many  financial econo- 
mists blame our crude models of the relation between  observable informa- 
tion  and  unobservable  fundamental  values.  For example,  perhaps  Roll 
(1984) is  unable  to  explain  changes  in  the  price of  orange juice futures 
because he does not include all relevant information, or because he uses the 
wrong functional form. However,  it is hard to imagine a plausible model of 
fundamental value in which the small amount of information observed on 
October 19, 1987, could trigger a rational 22 percent drop in prices. 
I have had helpful  discussions  with Kevin  M. Murphy  and Andrei  Shleifer. 
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